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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 14/06/2008

Accident number: 579

Accident time: 11:45

Accident Date: 26/11/2005

Where it occurred: Lutaya, 3.5 km West of
Yei town
Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Country: Sudan
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: 30/11/2005

ID original source: None

Name of source: UNMAO Sudan

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: M14 AP blast

Ground condition: dry/dusty
grass/grazing area
hard
metal fragments
metal scrap
Date last modified: 14/06/2008

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east: E 30 38.728

Map north: N 04 04.534

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
handtool may have increased injury (?)
inadequate training (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)

Accident report
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Details of this accident were made available as a collection of files in June 2008. The
conversion of these files to DDAS format has led to some original formatting being lost. The
original files are held on record. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial.

IMSMA Accident report
The deminer was doing clearance around an accident site where an AP mine blew off the tire
of a car on the 23rd November. The soil in the area is hard and there are lots of metal pieces
in the ground. The mine was detonated by the deminer during excavation most likely due to
incorrect procedures. The blast went through a gap between the visor and the vest and
caused injuries to the deminers face. Also the thumb on his right hand received injuries. The
leather gloves the deminer was wearing saved him from worse injuries.

UNMAO initial report
Introduction
On Saturday 26 August 2005 @ 1250hrs UNMAS Sub Office YEI was informed by [Demining
NGO’s Acting Ops Manager] that a mine accident had. taken place in LUTAYA and we were
asked to participate in the initial accident investigation. UNMAS Ops Officer, [Name removed],
accompanied [Demining NGO’s Acting Ops Manager] to the accident site where they carried
out a on site investigation together.
Summary
The deminer, [the Victim], initiated what appears to have been a M14 AP mine at 1145hrs
while excavating in hard ground. The deminer suffered injuries to his right hand thumb and
blast/ fragmentation injuries to his face (cuts on jaw, lips and above right eyebrow).
Casevac procedures where immediately started on site by the Section Commander, [Name
removed], and the first report of the accident to [Demining NGO] Base was sent at 1150hrs.
After the medic on site had performed ABCD, administered 50mg of PETHADINE the
casualty was put in the ambulance where IV fluids (1000ml) and oxygen was given during
transport to the [Demining NGO] Hospital in YEI.
The casualty was admitted at the [Demining NGO] Hospital at 1207hrs (approximately 22
minutes after the accident).
Location of Incident
Lutaya village, Yei Town, N04 04.534; E30 38.728
Investigation Team
[Demining NGO officer] and UNMAS Operations Officer, investigated the accident on
Saturday November 26th 1310hrs.
Execution of Investigation
We used what had been assessed by [Demining NGO] to be a safe road, it is in daily use by
locals and NGOs, leading up to the site of the accident. 25-30 pictures of the area in general,
site of accident, detonation site and deminers’ equipment were taken from the areas
assessed by [Demining NGO] to be safe and from clearance lanes. [Pictures were not made
available.]
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Evidence
Ground: Dry, hard packed soil.
Two sites of detonation (one from mine initiated by truck earlier in the week, one from the
detonation causing the accident) approximately 30cm apart.
Vehicle(s) and Equipment: [Demining NGO] were working with the standard manual demining
and PPE equipment and tools on site.
The visor (with apparent damages, and blood on the lower inside, from the blast) was left at
the base of the lane where the deminer left it as he took it off after the blast.
The gloves that he was wearing were left approximately 5 metres, back and to the left from
the direction of clearance, further way from the visor.
This is the place where the section Commander caught up with the injured deminer.
There is blood on the gloves, and on the ground, at this location.
The right hand gloves’ thumb shows clear signs of having been damaged by the blast.
The PPE was taken off the injured deminer as he was being treated by the medic and was left
in a spot between the site of the detonation and the position where the deminer was given
medical treatment. The PPE has blood on the collar and around the neck.
The deminers’ prod was left in his working lane and bears no signs of having been damaged
by the blast. The prod can be ruled out as having been the tool that initiated the mine.
The handle of the trowel was found by [Demining NGO’s Acting Ops Manager] on site after
the on site investigation was concluded and as he was closing the area off.
According to [Demining NGO’s Acting Ops Manager] the trowel has clearly been damaged by
the detonation. This, and the accounts of the deminer and others involved, identifies the
trowel as the tool that initiated the mine. I have not seen the damaged trowel myself.
The detector and other tools were not on site when I conducted the on site investigation. Even
though all the equipment belonging to the injured deminer should have been left on site I do
not think that the removal of said equipment has in any way had any negative effects on the
investigation.
Mine / UXO: The team were conducting Technical Survey on the site of the accident as a
result of a truck having initiated what appears to have been an M14 AP mine a couple of days
earlier. Judging from the dimensions of the two detonation sites (the mine initiated by the
truck and the mine initiated by the deminer) and the injuries sustained by the deminer it
appears to have been a case of M14 AP mines.
No remnants from the mines were recovered during the technical survey and investigation.
The mine accident occurred approximately 50m from the resting area.
Casualty(s) (position, clothing, injuries): Injured deminer, [the Victim], was squatting with
his left knee on the ground, body facing forward towards the area to be cleared.
He was wearing his visor, PPE and gloves.
While excavating a signal, using a flat nosed trowel with his right hand, the deminer initiated
the mine.
The deminer suffered injuries to his right thumb and the blast managed to get on the inside of
his visor (between the PPE and bottom of the visor) causing cuts to the lower jaw, lips and
right eyebrow.
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Incident Details
[Demining NGO] were informed by locals of an incident involving a truck and a AP mine at
LUTAYA (SW of YEI) and sent a small demining team to conduct a Technical Survey of the
area two days later. UNMAS Ops Officer was informed of this by [Demining NGO’s Acting
Ops Manager].
Last year [Demining NGO] cleared almost 30000m2 in the area (Task ID SS001). The site of
the accident is approx 100 m west of where that clearance stopped.
However, the accident happened inside the DA called Lutaya 2
The accident site is a flat grass field that has been slashed by the workers at JRS.
Approximately three meters from the site of the detonation of the mine initiated by the truck on
November 23rd is a mango tree where the local people usually rest in the shade.
According to the survey report from 2004, an AT mine was removed close to the mango tree
in 1998.
The team leader had marked an area 25x25 m around the incident (truck and AP mine Nov.
23rd) site as DA.
The DA was limited by high vegetation towards east and south, the construction site to the
west and the road between St. Joseph church and the JRS compound to the north.
One deminer was deployed on the south side and one towards the road.
The deminers used a path leading through the DA as base lane.
The ground in the area is hard and contains lot of metal fragments, cartridges and other scrap
metal.
The grass in the area had been removed by labourers from JRS the previous week.
The medic and ambulance were located in the resting area, 100m west of the DA.
The team leader, [Name removed], acted as ambulance driver.
On the 25th the team cleared 46m2 without any finds except metal nails and cartridges.
The four deminers worked in pairs of two, working one hour shifts.
The drills used were as per SOP: Investigation and removal of all metal signals.
After pinpointing the object with the metal detector, the deminer should start 15 cm behind the
centre of the signal and investigate 15 cm to either side with the prodder until he reaches the
object. If he finds nothing with the prodder, he can assume it is only a piece of metal and dig it
out. If he hits something he suspect to be a mine, he will have to establish an excavation
trench from where he started prodding and 20 cm towards himself. The trench is to be 30cm
in width, 20 cm in length and 10 cm deep. The trench allows the deminer to excavate from the
side without risk of hitting the pressure plate of the mine from the top. For every 2.5 cm he
shaves off the side of his trench, he will prod the wall and base. If the soil is hard, the deminer
will have to use water to soften it.
Sequence of events:
09:45– Work start at on site
11:20 – Deminer starts his shift
11:45 – Time of accident
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11:50 – Accident reported to [Demining NGO] Base
12:00 – Message to all demining teams to stop work and return to camp
12:07 – Casualty arrived at [Demining NGO] Hospital in YEI
12:19 – Accident scene closed off, cordon set
12:20 – [Demining NGO] Ops officer arrive accident site with medical coordinator
13:00 – UNMAS Ops officer alerted
13:10 – UNMAS+[Demining NGO] Investigation team arrive accident site
13:45 – UNMAS+[Demining NGO] Investigation at site completed
14:45 – Area marked and closed off
15:30 – [Demining NGO] Debrief with all deminers in field camp in Ronyi
16:00 – [Demining NGO] Debrief with everybody involved in accident
17.00 – UNMAS Ops officer starts interviews
The deminer involved in the accident was working his first shift of the day. He had been
working for 25 minutes when the accident occurred.
During the course of work, the deminer received several warnings from the section
commander to be particularly cautious as he approached the crater from the last detonation
as AP mines often are laid in clusters of four. The section commander also stopped him twice
for him to correct his PPE. Two minutes after the last correction, the mine went off. This
information has been confirmed by the second deminer at the site.
After the detonation the deminer stood up and started running away from the site. The section
commander managed to stop him, sat him down and started calming him down (position were
the deminers damaged and bloody gloves were left).
The section commander then called the medic on the radio and informed him there had been
an accident. The team leader, medic and survey assistant rushed to the site with stretcher
and trauma kit.
The casualty was taken out of the DA by the section commander and the medic started his
treatment. The deminer had a deep cut in his right thumb and a smaller cut on top of his
hand. In the face he had a deep cut over his right eye and on his chin in addition to several
minor cuts. Soil and dirt had entered into his eyes but did not cause any permanent damage.
The injuries were bandaged and intravenous fluids and painkillers were administered.
After making his assessment of the situation the team leader then collected the ambulance,
posted sentries and alerted [Demining NGO] base in Logobero.
10 minutes after the accident, the casualty was in the ambulance on his way to hospital. The
casualty arrived in the hospital at 12:07. At 14:30 surgery started.
[Demining NGO]’s acting ops manager and medical coordinator were attending the Weekly
Mine action Coordination meeting at the [Name removed] compound at the time of the
accident. They received the information about the accident at 12:20. 5 min later, they arrived
at the accident site. After a short brief at the site from the manual demining TA,[Name
removed], who had arrived 10 min earlier, they continued to the hospital.
The medical coordinator went to follow up on the casualty while the acting ops manager went
to inform the UNMAS ops officer to get the investigation started.
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The deminer’s explanation:
This is the information received from the deminer, [the Victim], at the [Demining NGO]
Hospital in Yei on the 27th November. Present during the interview were [Name removed],
UNMAS, and [Demining NGO’s Acting Ops Manager], [Demining NGO] MA. The interview
lasted from 14:10 to 14:25.
Before he entered the field, he received instructions from his section commander to wear his
PPE correctly, be careful and remove all metal pieces. The section commander made it clear
that he would be working close to the site where a truck hit a mine on the 23rd.
The ground was very hard and contained lots of metal pieces.
He had been working for 20-25 minutes and found three metal nails so far when he had a
new reading on his detector. He tried to prod, but the ground was too hard and he did not
have water to soak the ground. He then took his trowel and established an excavation trench
15 cm behind the signal before he started excavating the soil off from the side. He then found
a small nail. When he checked the spot again, there still was a signal from the same area. He
continued excavating. On the third scrape, the mine went off.
He then stood up and started running towards his section commander.
Additional information:
The deminer has been working with [Demining NGO] since April 2004. He completed his
demining training in May the same year. Since then he has been employed as a deminer in
Manual team 1. Throughout the time he has been employed he and his fellow deminers have
received refreshment training several times. The last time was end of October 2005.

Medical assistance and evacuation
After the detonation and having sat the deminer on the ground the section commander called
the medic on the radio and informed him there had been an accident. The team leader, medic
and survey assistant rushed to the site with stretcher and trauma kit. The casualty was taken
out of the DA by the section commander and the medic started his treatment.
The deminer had a deep cut in his right hand thumb and a smaller cut on top of his hand.
He had a deep cut over his right eye and on his chin in addition to several minor cuts.
Soil and dirt had entered into his eyes but did not cause any permanent damage.
The injuries were bandaged and intravenous fluids and painkillers were administered in a safe
area in the proximity of the site of the accident.
After making his assessment of the situation the team leader then collected the ambulance,
posted sentries and alerted [Demining NGO] base in Logobero.
10 minutes after the accident, the casualty was in the ambulance on his way to hospital. The
casualty arrived in the hospital at 12:07. At 14:30 surgery started.
I (RF) have not asked when the team last carried out casevac training.I have not asked if a
casevac exercise was conducted on site before they started work on site on the 25th of
November. I have not asked for records of casevac training and do not know if there were
records of casevac training in the site log. I have not checked the contents of the trauma pack
or the ambulance as I do not have access to [Demining NGO]’s accredited SOPs or National
Technical Guidelines and Standards.
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The drive from the site of the accident to the [Demining NGO] Hospital appears to have been
fast for the local road conditions, but this should not have done anything to worsen the injuries
or status of the patient. The doctor at the [Demining NGO] Hospital in YEI has not been
interviewed.

Geography and Weather
The team leader had marked an area 25x25 m around the incident (truck and AP mine Nov.
23rd) site as DA. The DA was limited by high vegetation towards east and south, the
construction site to the west and the road between St. Joseph church and the JRS compound
to the north. The deminers used a path leading through the DA as base lane.
The ground in the area is hard and contains lot of metal fragments, cartridges and other scrap
metal. The grass in the area had been removed by labourers from JRS the previous week.
The medic and ambulance were located in the resting area, approximately 100m west of the
DA.
On the 25th the team cleared 46m2 without any finds except metal nails and cartridges. The
four deminers worked in pairs of two, working one hour shifts.
The weather was hot sun and clear skies.

Demining Procedure: Manual demining procedures.

Demining Equipment / Tools / PPE / Explosives
Visor (appears to have been in good shape before the detonation)
PPE (appears to be in good shape)
Trowel - HAVE NOT SEEN THE TROWEL SO I CANNOT SAY WHAT SHAPE IT MIGHT
HAVE BEEN IN BEFORE OR AFTER THE ACCIDENT. [Demining NGO’s Acting Ops
Manager] says that it was a wedge shaped, flat nosed trowel.

Communications
From [Demining NGO]s report:
“The procedures at the radio room in Logobero could have been better. The accident
happened during change over of radio operator and there were a great deal of confusion with
the radio log in the beginning. Personnel in the field reacted quickly and other activities were
stopped shortly after the accident.”
I, [Name removed], have not checked their Radio Log but according to all information
obtained during the course of the investigation the accident was reported to [Demining NGO]
base at 1150hrs. It is unclear if radio checks have been carried out at the start of operations
and on a regular basis, but this is due to the fact that I have not asked and have not checked
the radio logs. For the same reason it is also unclear exactly what information that was sent
from the site of the accident to [Demining NGO] Base.
[Demining NGO’s Acting Ops Manager] came to the OCHA office in YEI at 1250 hrs and at
that time he verbally informed UNMAS Operation Officer on the details of the accident.
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UNMAS Operations Officer tried calling Regional TA, [Name removed], Regional Planning
Officer/ Acting Chief of Operations, [Name removed], and Operations Officer JUBA, [Name
removed] immediately after completing initial investigation on the site of the accident (approx.
1340hrs) without getting hold of either of them.
At approximately 1345 UNMAS Operations Officer managed to get hold of Operation Officer
KHARTOUM, [Name removed].
[Name removed] was informed of the accident and the initial findings of the investigation.
[Name removed] was informed that RF would go to the [Demining NGO] Hospital in YEI to
see what kind of damages the deminer had sustained and what the status was of the
deminer. [I] said that [I] would call [Name removed] up after the visit to the hospital.
At approximately 1445hrs [I] called [Name removed] and informed him of the injuries
sustained by the deminer and his current status. It was agreed that [Demining NGO]s and
[my] initial investigation reports were to be sent to the Regional TA, [Name removed], and CC
[Name removed] Monday before lunch (within 48 hours of the accident).

Site Layout and Marking
It is unclear whether the site layout was in accordance with the SOPs as I do not have access
to accredited copies of [Demining NGO]’s SOPs, but it appears that the general layout of the
site was in accordance with international standards.
The only question mark is in regards to the distances between the two clearance lanes. The
lanes were approximately 10-15 metres apart. The deminer in the second lane sustained no
injuries from the detonation of the mine.
[Demining NGO’s Acting Ops Manager], upon being asked the question, said that in the
accredited SOPs the supervisor on site does not have the authority to minimize the distance
between lanes based on what kind of threat (type of mines) is to be expected on a specific
site, but that amendments to that effect have been sent for accreditation.

Command and Control
There were one international supervisor, [Name removed] TA Survey, and one local Section
Commander.
It appear that even though the Section Commander has been reminding the deminers to wear
their PPE properly and told the deminer involved in the accident to exercise extra caution on
approaching the location of the first detonation (truck, AP mine, Nov. 23rd) he has not
corrected the deminer when he was using excavation methods that did not comply with
accredited SOPs and allowing the deminers to excavate in hard soil without watering the
ground. This is probably because they did not have jerry cans with water on site (based on
the information from the injured deminer).
It does appear that the Section Commander has acted properly once the accident occurred,
by stopping the injured deminer from moving into potentially dangerous areas, informing the
medic of the accident over the radio and leaving as much as possible of the injured deminers’
equipment on site.
It does appear as if there might have been not enough supervision of the excavation
procedures (and the lack of watering the ground) from the international supervisor.
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The international supervisor made a good decision when not calling for the Super Puma
immediately upon the accident, but instead waited for the assessment of the medic before
deciding on how to proceed with the casevac. This was probably also because of the
international supervisors own assessment of the injuries sustained by the deminer.

Quality Assurance and Control
It was the second day on site for the team. QA/ QC logs have not been asked for and have
not been checked.

Details of Non Compliance to Agency SOP / NTSG / IMAS
•
•
•
•

Not using water to soften up hard soil to make it possible to prod the ground in
accordance with SOPs
Not using an excavation trench when excavating.
Not excavating from the side, but from the top down.
Not stopping BAC when evidence of mines found.

Unknowns:
•
•
•
•

Casevac exercise prior to starting work on site? In accordance with SOPs and
NTSG?
Radio procedure as per SOPs?
QA procedures as per SOPs?
Contents of Trauma bag as per SOPs and NTSG?

CONCLUSIONS
It is my conclusion based on the injuries sustained by the deminer, interviews and from the on
site investigation that the following has occurred:
-Deminer has not watered the ground to soften the soil up so he could use his prod properly.
-He has not used excavation trenches when excavating unknown objects that would enable
him to approach the unknown object from the side.
-The Section Commander has not stopped the deminer from breaching the SOPs when it
comes to watering, prodding and excavation.
-The deminer has not been wearing his PPE properly at all times, but had to be told on a
number of occasions by his Section Commander to correct his PPE.
-It appears that the deminer has been excavating signal from on top of the signal and straight
down towards the unknown object rather than excavating from the side.
-It appears that the deminer has been using his trowel pointing down towards the ground, with
his right hand thumb pointing down towards the project (therefore damages to his thumb and
the top of his hand, but not to the other fingers).
-It appears that the gloves the deminer was wearing at the time of the accident might have
saved his thumb.
-It appears that the deminer, even though he had just corrected his PPE, has worked in a
position that opened up an area between the lower part of the visor and the PPE that enabled
the blast to be channeled up under the visor causing cuts to the lower face and right eyebrow.
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-It appears that the deminer after the blast has moved in the opposite direction and to the left,
from the direction of clearance, moving towards potentially dangerous areas and that the
Section Commander has managed to stop the deminer in time.
-It appears that the Section Commander has correctly informed personnel in the resting area
of the accident and has called medic and stretcher carriers and site supervisor forward to a
safe area closer to the casualty, and that he then has taken the casualty to them.
-It appears that the medic on site has done a correct and good job with the initial treatment of
the casualty
-It appears that the site supervisor made the right assessment when not calling for the Super
Puma, but waited for the assessment of the medic before deciding on how to proceed with the
casevac
-It appears as if [Demining NGO] has followed correct procedure upon the accident by
informing their base and suspending work on all manual demining sites
-It appears that [Demining NGO] informed the UNMAS Operations Officer as soon as they
had the possibility to (within an hour of the accident)
-[Demining NGO] has been most accommodating during the course of the investigation
-It does however appear as if the injured deminer is not telling the truth when he claims that
he used excavation trenches when excavating signals and that he was excavating from the
side towards the object when the detonation occurred.
The accident has to be classified as “avoidable” if [Demining NGO] SOPs and procedures had
been implemented correctly on site.

Further Actions, Recommendations and Lessons Learned
-Initial Survey assessments need to be formalised and recorded and this information needs to
be on site readily available
-Threat assessments need to be formalised and recorded.
-On site casevac exercises before starting task on new site. Casevac training needs to be
carried out in accordance with SOPs and recorded onsite in the site paperwork.
-Casevac training needs to encompass all the accident procedure including what happens
after the ambulance has left site.
-During a casevac the vehicle speed should be acceptable but not excessive depending on
the local situation and agreed in company policy
-Command and control needs to be maintained at all times to ensure safety.
-SOPs need to be checked and written in accordance with what the teams should actually do
on the ground.
-Clearance should only proceed when the proper equipment is on site so the SOPs for
marking and clearance can be followed and easily understood.
-Internal and external QA assessments need to be carried out on a regular basis to confirm
team drills and skills.
The following recommendations were made by [Demining NGO] and I agree with them:
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“Before resuming demining operations, a minimum of two days must be spent retraining the
deminers, section commanders and team leaders, emphasizing on correct use of tools and
PPE. The section commanders must be given closer follow up so that they are capable to
interfere when they see breaches to the SOP. The SOP must be scrutinized to find out if
there are any unclear points with regards to use of water when the ground is hard. The TA for
manual demining will work out a training program that covers the mentioned subjects.
No manual demining activities will take place until retraining is completed and ops manager
and manual demining TA together with UNMAS have evaluated the status of the teams.”

Full [Demining NGO] Sudan Accident report
Accident report mine accident Lutaya 26/11-2005
At 1145, 26th November, [Demining NGO] had a demining accident in Lutaya, 3.5 km West of
Yei town. The deminer sustained injuries to his face as well as his right hand. He is now in the
[Demining NGO] hospital in Yei Town.

Background
On the 23rd of November a truck working at the construction site outside the JRS teacher’s
training Center in Lutaya hit a mine and blew off a tire. [Demining NGO] was informed of the
accident and responded by sending an investigation team two days later. Last year [Demining
NGO] cleared almost 30000m2 in the area (Task ID SS001). The site of the accident is
approx 100 m west of where the clearance stopped. However, the accident happened inside
the DA called Lutaya 2. The accident site is a flat grass field that has been slashed by the
workers at JRS. Three meters from the old crater is a mango tree where the local people
usually rest in the shade. According to the survey report from 2004, an AT mine was removed
close to the mango tree in 1998.

Personnel present at time of accident
[All names removed] Team leader; Section commander; Deminer; Deminer; Deminer;
Deminer; Medic; Survey assistant.
All deminers in the team have worked as deminers since May 2004, the section commander
since June 2005.

Location
The team leader had marked an area 25x25 m around the accident site as DA. The DA was
limited by high vegetation towards east and south, the construction site to the west and the
road between St. Joseph church and the JRS compound to the north. One deminer was
deployed on the south side and one towards the road. The deminers used a path leading
through the DA as base lane. The ground in the area is hard and contains lot of metal
fragments, cartridges and other scrap metal. The grass in the area had been removed by
laborers from JRS the previous week. The medic and ambulance were located in the resting
area, 100m west of the DA. The team leader acted as ambulance driver. On the 25th the
team cleared 46m2 without any finds except metal nails and cartridges.

11

Procedures used
The deminers worked in pairs with one hour rotation shifts. The drills used were as per SOP:
Investigation and removal of all metal signals. After pinpointing the object with the metal
detector, the deminer should start 15 cm behind the center of the signal and investigate 15
cm to either side with the prodder until he reaches the object. If he finds nothing with the
prodder, he can assume it is only a piece of metal and dig it out. If he hit something he
suspect to be a mine, he will have to establish an excavation trench from where he started
prodding and 20 cm towards himself. The trench is to be 30cm in width, 20 cm in length and
10 cm deep. The trench allows the deminer to excavate from the side without risk of hitting
the pressure plate of the mine from the top. For every 2.5 cm he shaves off the side of his
trench, he will prod the wall and base. If the soil is hard, the deminer will have to use water to
soften it.

Chain of events
09:45– work start at JRS
11:20 – deminer started his shift
11:45 – Time of accident
11:50 – Accident reported to [Demining NGO] Base
12:00 – Message to all demining teams to stop work and return to camp
12:07 – Casualty arrived hospital
12:19 – Accident scene closed off, cordon set
12:20 – Ops officer arrive accident site with medical coordinator
13:00 – UNMAS Ops officer alerted
13:10 – Investigation team arrive accident site
13:45 – Investigation at site completed
14:45 – Area marked and closed off
15:30 – Debrief with all deminers in field camp in Ronyi
16:00 – Debrief with everybody involved in accident
17.00 – UNMAS Ops officer starts interviews
The deminer who had the accident was working his first shift of the day. He had been working
for 25 minutes when the accident occurred. During the course of work, the deminer received
several warnings from the section commander to be particularly cautious as he approached
the crater from the last detonation as AP mines often are laid in clusters of four. The section
commander also stopped him twice for him to correct his PPE. Two minutes after the last
correction, the mine went off. This information has been confirmed by the second deminer at
the site. After the detonation the deminer stood up and started running away from the site.
The section commander managed to stop him, sat him down and started calming him down.
The section commander then called the medic on the radio and informed him there had been
an accident. The team leader, medic and survey assistant rushed to the site with stretcher
and trauma kit. The casualty was taken out of the DA by the section commander and the
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medic started his treatment. The deminer had a deep cut in his right thumb and a smaller cut
on top of his hand. In the face he had a deep cut over his right eye and on his chin in addition
to several minor cuts. Soil and dirt had entered into his eyes but did not cause any permanent
damage. The injuries were bandaged and intravenous fluids and painkillers were
administered. After making his assessment of the situation the team leader then collected the
ambulance, posted sentries and alerted [Demining NGO] base in Logobero. 10 minutes after
the accident, the casualty was in the ambulance on his way to hospital. The casualty arrived
in the hospital at 12:07. At 14:30 surgery started.
The acting ops manager and medical coordinator were at a meeting at the SLIRI compound
at the time of the accident. They received the information about the accident at 12:20. 5 min
later, they arrived at the accident site. After a short brief at the site from the manual demining
TA, who had arrived 10 min earlier, they moved on to the hospital. The medical coordinator
went to follow up on the casualty while the acting ops manager went to inform the UNMAS
ops officer to get the investigation started.

The deminer’s explanation
This is the information received from the deminer, [the Victim], at the [Demining NGO]
Hospital in Yei on the 27th November. Present during the interview were [Name removed],
UNMAS, and [Demining NGO’s Acting Ops Manager], [Demining NGO] MA. The interview
lasted from 14:10 to 14:25.
Before he entered the field, he received instructions from his section commander to wear his
PPE correctly, be careful and remove all metal pieces. The section commander made it clear
that he would be working close to the site where a truck hit a mine on the 23rd. The ground
was very hard and contained lots of metal pieces. He had been working for 20-25 minutes
and found three metal nails so far when he had a new reading on his detector. He tried to
prod, but the ground was too hard and he did not have water to soak the ground. He then
took his excavation shovel and established an excavation trench 15 cm behind the signal
before he started scraping the soil off from the side. He then found a small nail. When he
checked the spot again, there still was a signal from the same area. He then started scraping
again. On the third scrape, the mine went off. He then stood up and started running towards
his section commander.
Additional information: The deminer has been working with [Demining NGO] since April 2004.
He completed his demining training in May the same year. Since then he has been employed
as a deminer in Manual team 1. Throughout the time he has been employed he and his fellow
deminers have received refreshment training several times. The last time was end of October
2005.

Actions taken after the accident
All demining operations in Ronyi and at UNHCR were stopped as soon as the accident was
reported and the deminers were taken back to their respective camps. As soon as the
situation was under control all deminers were gathered in the demining camp in Ronyi. The
manual demining TA and the team leader at the accident site gave a briefing about what had
happened and gave them an update on the deminer’s situation. All personnel involved in the
accident then were transported to Logobero for an internal debrief. Each team member gave
their description of what happened and wrote a short statement on what they had seen and
experienced. The statements are attached to this report. [Handwritten statements held on
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record.] As a part of the investigation [Name removed] from UNMAS then came to interview
the team leader, the section commander and the medic. All deminers were then given time off
until Monday morning.

Accident investigation
[Name removed] from UNMAS was informed 1hour and 15min after the time of the accident.
He was taken to the accident site where he did his inquiries. The crater from the explosion is
30-40 cm away from the old crater. It is a small crater, 15 cm in diameter. The deminer’s base
stick was 20 cm behind the edge of the crater, one meter from the base lane. The handle of
the deminers shovel was found 15m away from where he was working, the blade blown off.
This confirms the deminer’s story that he was excavating at the time of the accident. The size
of the crater indicates a small AP blast mine. The blast has gone between the visor and the
vest of the deminer.

Crater from detonation
The explanations from the casualty and the section commander are diverging. The deminer
claims that he established an excavation trench and worked from the side towards the object.
This is not supported by the section commander. There are also no signs at the site that this
was done. On the contrary, the holes from the other objects that have been removed show
that the objects have been taken straight out of the ground. Both deminer and section
commander admitted that water had not been used.
As for the facial injuries, a test done at the accident site show that it is possible to get a gap
between the visor and the vest even if the PPE appears to be worn correctly.

Gap between visor and vest [See analysis]
Conclusion
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The accident happened because of breaches to the SOP. First of all, water was not used to
soften the ground. This made both prodding and excavation difficult. Without being able to
prod down to sufficient depth, the deminer could not know whether the object was a mine or
something else. To be able to dig in hard soil one has to use force. If this force is applied from
the top it is more than enough to set off an AP mine. This is the second breach to the SOP
and most likely the cause for the accident. A contributing factor to the accident might be that
the detonation 30 cm away three days earlier plus the fact that the mine might has been in the
ground for years might have made the mine more unstable.
The SOP is a bit vague on what happens when the soil is hard. It states that water may be
used to soften the ground, but it makes no reference to what actions the deminer should take
if water is not available.
When the accident first happened, the medical procedures at the site worked very well. The
casualty was quickly stabilized and moved to hospital. The procedures at the radio room in
Logobero could have been better. The accident happened during change over of radio
operator and there were a great deal of confusion with the radio log in the beginning.
Personnel in the field reacted quickly and other activities were stopped shortly after the
accident.

Recommendation
Before resuming demining operations, a minimum of two days must be spent retraining the
deminers, section commanders and team leaders, emphasizing on correct use of tools and
PPE. The section commanders must be given closer follow up so that they are capable to
interfere when they see breaches to the SOP. The SOP must be scrutinized to find out if
there are any unclear points with regards to use of water when the ground is hard. The TA for
manual demining will work out a training program that covers the mentioned subjects.
No manual demining activities will take place until retraining is completed and ops manager
and manual demining TA together with UNMAS have evaluated the status of the teams.

Victim Report
Victim number: 755

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: 25 minutes

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron, Visor
worn raised

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
minor Eyes
severe Face
severe Hand
COMMENT: See Medical report.
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Medical report
No formal medical report was made available. The investigation includes the following:
The deminer had a deep cut in his right hand thumb and a smaller cut on top of his hand.
He had a deep cut over his right eye and on his chin in addition to several minor cuts.
Soil and dirt had entered into his eyes but did not cause any permanent damage.
[It is presumed that surgical intervention was required because the Victim was retained in
hospital.]

Statements
Attachments: Statements from team members
[Most statements are handwritten so not reproduced. They are held on file.]

Accident Report from Lutaya Teacher Training Centre
I am employed as Technical Advisor Survey in [Demining NGO] Mine Action.
[Demining NGO] MA has previously conducted deming operation in the Lutaya area. Jesuitt
Refugee Service has started building of a new compound in Lutaya TTC area. On Nov. 23rd a
truck hit an anti personnel mine when unloading building materials near the foundation of the
new compound. The truck sustained minor damage and the driver was not injured. Based on
this JRS requested [Demining NGO] MA to conduct demining on the site.
The operation started Nov.25th and proceeded without any problem. Due to the large quantity
of metal in the soil, the work was time consuming and a total of 45, 8 m2 was cleared
yesterday.
The operation started today at 0945 hours without any problems. I was working on a sketch in
the rest area and at 1145 hours I heard an explosion. Accompanied by team-medic [Name
removed] and surveyor [Name removed], I rushed to the accident site with a stretcher and the
trauma bag. Section Commander [Name removed] was sitting next to deminer [the Victim]
who had been injured during demining. It seemed that the deminer had detonated an AP mine
during excavation and the blast had gone on the inside of his visor since he had facial
injuries. He also had injuries on his left hand and his left thumb was damaged. We managed
to get the casualty to safe ground, which in this case was a well defined and used foot path
before the team medic started First Aid. I went back to the rest area to fetch the vehicle and
to report the accident to [Demining NGO] MA in Logobero. The injured deminer was then
transferred to the vehicle and we left the accident site at 1155. [Name removed] and deminer
[Name removed] stayed with two guards from JRS on the site to seal off the area and protect
equipment. During the transport I reported the situation to [Demining NGO] MA and
requested the radio operator to notify Yei hospital about the accident, type of injuries and
expected arrival time. We arrived the hospital at 1207 hours and the patient was received by
Dr. [Name removed].
At 1430 surgery started on the injured deminer.
Logobero, Nov.26th 2005
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Signed: TA Survey

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Field control inadequacy” because the
supervision ratio was very high and yet the Victim was permitted to work with his visor raised
and while excavating in a dangerous manner with a short hand tool that separated in a balst
so that hand injury was almost guaranteed. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate
training” because the investigators (internal and external) agreed that refresher training was
required.
The supposed “proof” that environmental fragmentation could enter between the visor and the
vest at an angle that allowed eyebrow injury while wearing the visor correctly illustrates the
internal investigator’s lack of understanding about blast events. When an AP blast mine
detonation occurs while a deminer is kneeling and excavating, the environmental
fragmentation (earth and mine casing) strikes the visor face marginally before the blast wave.
The blast wave may raise the visor, but it follow the fragments. The fragmentation is tumbling
in the air but has forward momentum. If it has enough momentum to cause injury, that
momentum imposes a direction that prevents any fragment turning sharply and heading in an
entirely different direction.

This picture was included in the report to show how fragments could get between the visor
and the vest. In fact it illustrates how it could not.

In order to strike the wearer’s face to the eyebrow, the deminer was wearing the visor raised
in something more like this position. He was looking out from under it as he worked, and if he
did not sustain eye injury that is because the M14 mine is very small (29g Tetryl) and he was
lucky.
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